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Exploring the “unity” of the virtues: The case of an allocentric quintet 
Abstract 
This paper has two interrelated aims. First we explore a novel conceptual analysis of the 
“unity” of the virtues. Virtues come in clusters differentiated by broad functions within 
overall character. We identify three such clusters — virtues of intelligent caring, virtues of 
willpower, and virtues of humility. Virtues within a cluster are “unified” by some 
commonality, e.g. justice, compassion, and truthfulness all are kinds of intelligent caring. 
The allocentric virtues, a sub-class of virtues of intelligent caring, are forms of intelligent 
caring about people. Virtues of willpower are capacities to manage impulses: desires, 
emotions, and habits. Virtues of humility are absences of vices of pride. These clusters 
support and exploit one another in a healthy character. Second, we explore whether empirical 
psychology can support conceptual analysis such as we propose. Our discussion of the 
conceptual analysis and empirical studies of the relations between pairs of allocentric virtues 
illustrates this exploration. 
 
Keywords: Virtues, unity of virtues, gratitude, compassion, humility, forgiveness, 
generosity 
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Introduction 
How are virtues connected with one another, and how are inquirers to approach this question 
for maximum precision and plausibility? We will propose a version of the “unity” of the 
virtues thesis that involves dividing them into at least three types. Acknowledging this 
division, as well as subdivisions within it, allows a more nuanced account of the 
interconnections and their strength than traditional accounts of the unity of the virtues. We 
will propose, as well, a coordination of conceptual analysis and empirical investigation as 
maximizing our understanding of virtues’ interconnections. After a general sketch of the 
interconnections of virtues, we will illustrate this point and sketch our approach to the inquiry 
with an analysis of an allocentric quintet of generosity, forgivingness, compassion, gratitude 
and humility (section 2).  
 
 
The unity of the virtues 
Socrates taught that “virtue is one” (Plato, 1997, Protagoras 329d and following). By 
this he apparently meant that there is literally only one virtue, though it goes by different 
names–“justice,” “courage,” “temperance,” “wisdom,” and so forth. If these words refer to 
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parts of Virtue, the “parts” are not distinct, because justice is pious and piety just, and so 
forth for all pairs of “parts.” This is the strongest possible version of the “unity of virtue” 
thesis. For a defense, see Penner (1973).  
A weaker view is that virtues logically entail one another: you cannot have courage 
without being just, nor justice without having courage, and so forth for all pairs of virtues. 
Here the traits are not all the same trait, but no virtue is separable from any of the others. 
This view has been attributed to Aristotle. His rationale is that each of the virtues requires 
practical wisdom (Nicomachean Ethics 6.13, 1145a1–2). We might explain his view as 
follows. If situations divided up neatly into ones that call for justice, ones that call for 
compassion, ones that call for courage, and so forth, then it would be possible to have the 
practical wisdom that goes with one of the virtues while lacking the practical wisdom that 
goes with some others. But life-situations are not like that. The same situation that calls for 
justice may call also for courage, or compassion. So the virtues overlap in their relevance to 
situations. If so, then to be consistently just, a person will have to have the aspects of wisdom 
that go with compassion and courage, and so forth for all the moral virtues. But one cannot 
be wise in respect of any virtue without actually having that virtue. So a person cannot have 
any moral virtue without having all the moral virtues. For a sympathetic but critical 
discussion of this Aristotelian view, see Wolf (2007). 
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Aristotle’s view depends on the premise that each distinct virtue requires practical 
wisdom, and that the virtues are all similar in that respect. Wolf (2007) illustrates this 
assumption in her treatment of Aristotle’s view. We think that this assumption is 
questionable. While courage does require that persons be sensible about how to achieve what 
they want in risky situations, and that they have some skills of fear-management, it seems 
clear that some very courageous people are not notably wise. They sometimes use their 
considerable courage for unwise purposes. They contrast, in this way, with highly just people; 
for a person cannot be deeply just without being notably wise. If this is right, then virtues do 
not generally entail one another, and the Aristotelian view is not in all regards correct.  
In the remainder of this section we will propose another construal of the “unity” of the 
virtues. Our brief account can at best be only a sketch, a broad outline of some of the main 
kinds of virtues in their structural interlocking. Proper pride, temperance, and a sense of 
humor will, for example, be left untouched. Our account will be organic in a broad sense. 
Just as a human body has parts whose differences from one another are essential to their 
distinctive functional contributions to the whole body’s wellbeing and functioning, so a 
moral character has aspects which, in themselves, differ significantly from one another, and 
whose differences are essential to their contributions to overall character. Just as the organs 
of a body depend for their functions on other organs in the same body (for example, the right 
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and left hands depending on each other in many tasks, and all other organs depending on the 
heart and lungs), so, for example, courage depends on justice and compassion for proper 
motivation of courageous action in many circumstances, and justice and compassion can 
depend, in a different way, on courage. Such interdependencies constitute the organic 
connections of virtues to one another. Thus to understand the “unity” of the virtues is to 
reckon both with differences among the types of virtues and with the consequent differential 
functions by which they can interact. 
Three main types of good character traits are the virtues of intelligent caring (such as 
justice, truthfulness, compassion, generosity, and gratitude), the virtues of willpower (such 
as self-control, courage, perseverance, and patience), and the virtue(s) of humility (such as 
being unpretentious, unassuming, gentle, unsnobbish, and properly deferential). These 
clusters of virtues are like types of organs in a body. Types of organs constitute interrelated 
systems (hands, feet, legs and arms; digestive; circulatory; etc.), and these systems constitute 
the larger system that is the body.  
Roberts (1984) distinguishes substantive-motivational virtues such as justice, 
generosity, compassion, the sense of duty, and truthfulness from virtues of willpower such 
as courage, perseverance, self-control, and patience (Adams 2006, calls this latter kind of 
virtue “structural”, pp. 33–4). Subsequently in this paper we will use ‘virtues of intelligent 
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caring’ for what Roberts calls ‘substantive-motivational.’ The virtues of intelligent caring are 
substantive in reflecting the actual substance of morality, broadly speaking: they embody 
rules of fair play, helpfulness to those in need, the criteria of justice in their several forms, 
the concept of duty, and the intrinsic values of truth. They are “motivational” because they 
supply moral concern: to be just, for example, is to care about other people’s rights. At the 
core of each of the virtues of this class is a concern for a conceptually determinate object–
justice, truth, human wellbeing in one or another regard, etc. People differ in the strength of 
their concern for such things, but they also differ in their particular understanding of the 
object. To be concerned about something is necessarily to understand it in some way. 
Different people who care about justice may have diverse understandings of it, more or less 
nuanced (rigid), universal (tribally limited), or specialized (racial justice, justice in war). One 
whose concern for justice is a virtue of justice will have to have an excellent or intelligent 
understanding of justice–deep, flexible, accurate, universal, etc. Such understanding is a part 
of wisdom in justice. Insofar as the wisdom is practical, it will also involve understanding 
how to implement and promote justice, a particular set of social skills. We could sketch a 
similar account of the other virtues whose core is a concern and involve an intelligent 
understanding of their objects.  
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Aristotle’s point about virtues’ overlapping relevance to situations is also pertinent. 
Justice bears an obvious relation to truth, and thus to truthfulness; similarly, it bears 
significantly on human suffering, and therefore on human affairs that concern compassion. 
The most perfectly just person will need to be truthful and compassionate, and to understand 
justice and human suffering and wellbeing in such a way as to know when justice 
considerations trump compassion considerations and vice-versa. We can see, then, that the 
virtues of intelligent caring are pretty well “unified,” especially if we think of the most perfect 
exemplifications of them. We allow that a person can have a virtue without being a perfect 
exemplar of it; given human nature, it would be unrealistic to impose such a high standard. 
And the imperfection of a very just person might well be located at her shortfall in one or 
more of the other virtues of intelligent caring.  
In a later section we will consider in more detail the “unity” of the virtues that make up 
‘the allocentric quintet’: generosity, gratitude, forgivingness, compassion, and humility. Our 
discussion will present a test case for our more general account of the “unity” of the virtues, 
and also massage the question whether empirical studies of the virtues can contribute to our 
understanding of their “unity.” We say ‘allocentric’ to suggest that these virtues essentially 
involve a focus on other people, in particular, an intelligent caring about them. This will 
make the quintet a sub-class of the virtues of intelligent caring. They constitute a sub-class 
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because not all virtues of caring take other people as their objects. Truthfulness, for example, 
is a caring about truth, while the sense of duty is a caring about duty and justice a caring 
about just states of affairs, institutions, etc. We should note that humility is a guest member 
of the quintet. But for reasons that we’ll consider momentarily, it plays very well with the 
other members, liberating them from characteristic impediments. 
The virtues of willpower are a different kind of ethical organ. They are powers of self-
management that can be activated by moral considerations, but also by others. A just person 
will need to be courageous where justice, compassion, or truthfulness requires facing threats, 
but, as the person who displays courage in rescuing his property from a burning house shows, 
the capacity to face known threats without discombobulation requires neither 1) that the agent 
be unconflicted, nor 2) that his end be supplied by any of the main virtues of caring. He may 
just want to rescue his property, and courage will come in handy.  
Our proposal faces objections on both fronts. Some feel that only moral dispositions 
merit the name of virtue, implying that courage not deployed in the service of moral ends is 
not a virtue. But this seems to be a modern prejudice. Aristotle agrees that moral ends are not 
the only ones that courage can serve when he says that fully courageous acts are “for the sake 
of the noble” (Nicomachean Ethics 3.7; hereafter NE). See Roochnik (2015, pp. 200–218) 
for an argument that Aristotle’s courageous person is not motivated by what we would call 
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moral considerations, but by the aim to be and remain a beautiful, honourable, soul. But we 
go further: courage can be exhibited even in actions not for the sake of the noble–for example, 
for the sake of rescuing one’s property from a fire. Nor does it require that courage involve 
no motivational conflict: we say that the ability to stand up to fear with rational self-
possession is a virtue: it is both admirable and very useful. 
Aristotle supports the first objection to our view–that courage rules out conflict. If 
courage is a virtue, thinks Aristotle, it doesn’t overcome fear; it is just a matter of fearing the 
right thing, for the right reason, for the right length of time, etc. (NE 3.7). The ability to 
overcome impulses is not virtue, but continence. That an impulse needs to be overcome 
shows a deficiency of virtue. This may seem paradoxical: isn’t fear by its very nature 
aversive–pushing the agent away from the threat, and therefore, in the case of acting in the 
face of fear, an impulse or conative pressure away from performing the appropriate or desired 
action? And if so, wouldn’t courage, as a disposition to perform intentional actions in the 
context of felt threats, have to have an element of managing an impulse (where the part of 
the “self” that is managed is the fearing self)? 
Consider also perseverance. Perseverance seems to be a different kind of disposition 
from a concern defined by an object of concern. It seems to be fundamentally an ability rather 
than a concern. True, to persevere in a task requires caring about something–winning a prize, 
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becoming a first-rate psychologist–but there is no particular kind of task one needs to care 
about; perseverance can even serve evil goals. It is the ability not to give up in psychological 
adversity like anxiety, discouragement, or the skepticism of companions. The perseverant 
person need not depend entirely on the continuity of her interest in or enthusiasm for a 
project–a dissertation, a marriage, a job; she has some mastery of her attention span. 
This ability will consist partly in self-management skills, partly in a kind of 
psychological muscle for resisting impulses contrary to one’s more fundamental goals 
(Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007). Baumeister and Tierney (2011) call it “willpower,” and 
seem to show that it can be strengthened with exercise, as James (1981) said. Most likely, 
perseverance combines these things, but in any case it is an ability, contrasting with the 
virtues of intelligent caring, which are ways of caring. Their relation seems to be this: our 
concerns set our goals; perseverance is often needed and (most likely) develops in the pursuit 
of goals.  
Aristotle calls the disposition that regularly overcomes adverse impulses, not 
“virtue,” but “continence” (enkrateia, or strength) and the disposition that regularly fails to 
do so not vice, but “incontinence” (akrasia, or weakness) (Nicomachean Ethics, book 7, 
chapters 1–10). We think it is natural to think of such strength in self-command as a human 
excellence, indeed an impressive achievement deserving the name of virtue, and we are not 
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alone in the history of moral psychology in thinking so. Immanuel Kant is perhaps the thinker 
who first comes to mind: for him, all virtue is the strength to resist impulses:  
Virtue is the strength of a human being’s maxim in fulfilling his duty.  Strength of 
any kind can be recognised only by the obstacles it can overcome; and in the case of 
virtue these obstacles are natural inclinations, which can come into conflict with the 
human being’s moral resolution (Kant, 1996, pp. 524–5, italics original).   
(Note that Kant calls strength of will ‘virtue’ only when it subserves the sense of moral duty; 
thus he disagrees with us on this point.) But after Aristotle and before Kant, thinkers such as 
the apostle Paul (Galatians 5.22) and Cicero (de Officiis 1.67–8) thought so too. 
 Furthermore, to the extent that the self-management virtues depend on sophisticated 
reflexive cognition, they are characteristically human virtues that distinguish us from all but 
the brainiest of the other animals (and possibly even from them). Also, we think that the 
division of these virtues from the properly moral virtues is a natural one for psychologists, 
who certainly do not limit the training they offer in “self-regulation” to moral applications, 
yet consider the powers so gained as contributing something good and essentially human to 
their subjects’ repertoire of dispositions, something required for living a good life–a very 
Aristotelian criterion for virtue. William James once advised us who wish to master ourselves 
 13 
to “do every day or two something for no other reason than that you would rather not do it, 
so that when the hour of dire need draws nigh, it may find you not unnerved and untrained 
to stand the test” (James, 1981, p. 126). So we propose the virtues of willpower as one main 
cluster or system. 
So far, we have distinguished two main groups of virtues, the virtues of intelligent 
caring and the virtues of willpower. We think humility, which we are treating as a guest 
member of our allocentric quintet, fits in neither of these two classes. We think that any time 
a person performs a humble action, or expresses humility by way of an emotional state (e.g. 
joy in another person’s triumph) or lack thereof (e.g. defensiveness), the motivation comes 
from somewhere other than humility–say, from one of the allocentric virtues, or the sense of 
justice, or the love of truth. Humility, as such, seems not to be a source of motivation; but 
equally, it isn’t a kind of self-control. One can summon self-control in the service of 
humility–try to be humble when one is having vain or arrogant impulses; but to be humble is 
not to need to try. 
Traditionally, humility has been thought of as the contrary of pride, where pride is 
thought of as a dysfunctionally inflated self-concept or concern for an inappropriate kind of 
personal importance (what one psychologist has called ‘narcissistic enhancement’ Reimer 
2009, p. 75). Accordingly, we have focused on such “vices” of pride as arrogance, vanity, 
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hyper-autonomy, domination, snobbery, envy, and various vices of tribal superiority such as 
racism, sexism, and homophobia. We say a person who had none of these defects, but was 
otherwise mentally healthy or virtuous, would be humble (see Roberts, 2017), and a person 
who lacks one of the vices of pride would have the corresponding virtue of humility. Thus 
we can explain why humility supplies no motive or self-management ability, yet is a virtue.  
Some are uncomfortable with the proposal that a virtue might consist in the absence 
of a certain kind of vice. A virtue, they feel, must be “positive”–“the absence of something 
negative does not necessarily imply the presence of something positive. Thus, humility [as 
something “positive”] is not just the absence of [such “negative” things as] narcissism, 
conceit, or arrogance” (Tangney, 2005). This principle runs against much of our everyday 
experience. Most people think it is a very good and “positive” thing to be without the AIDS 
virus. Of course, health with respect to the AIDS virus is not just its absence; the body in 
which the virus is absent needs to be functioning properly. But the situation is analogous with 
humility as an absence of the vices of pride. One who has good character in lacking these 
vices will have a number of other virtues that are not just an absence of something, but a 
well-formed concern or a well-developed ability. The lack of the vices of pride is just one 
aspect of good character, but it is a very important aspect, given the havoc that the vices of 
pride can play in a person’s moral life. It is the characteristic havoc played in so many human 
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lives by arrogance, vanity, domination, hyper-autonomy, self-righteousness, snobbery, 
selfish ambition, and other vices of pride that warrants making humility a major functional 
aspect of good moral character. Other “virtuous” absences are purity in water (nothing but 
the absence of pollutants) and openings in walls (nothing but stretches where the wall is 
absent).  
Let us summarize our general sketch of the “unity” of virtues. We have distinguished 
three kinds of virtues. Each makes a distinctive contribution to the life of virtue. The virtues 
of intelligent caring provide motivation to action and the concerns that are basic to the moral 
emotions, and embody the major conceptual content (“rules,” “principles,” “wisdom”) of the 
ethical life–concepts of justice, wellbeing, suffering and deficiency, duty, etc. The virtues of 
willpower are powers of self-management, composed of both strengths and skills. To the 
extent that the skills involve strategies, they too have some conceptual content, and thus 
“wisdom.” The virtues of willpower support the virtues of intelligent caring by supplying 
resistance to impeding factors such as fear, selfishness, lust, discouragement, the impulses of 
the vices of pride, and maladaptive habits. Humility is the absence of the concerns that we 
have called the vices of pride (with their understanding of life, which is an opposite of 
wisdom), thus a kind of freedom or purity. The virtues of willpower can provide a partial 
substitute for humility, in offering a resource for resisting the vices of pride such as envy, 
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snobbishness, and vanity, partly by managing their emotional outputs. The virtues of 
intelligent caring supply virtuous rationales and motivation for the exercise of the virtues of 
willpower. They support humility by providing motivations that are incompatible with, or at 
least offer friction against, the concerns of the vices of pride, so that growth in the virtues of 
intelligent caring is at the same time a diminishing of the vices of pride (thus an increase of 
humility). Humility fosters the virtues of intelligent caring by the elimination of ego-
pollution, and serves the virtues of willpower by allowing mental clarity about the need to 
deploy them, and clarity of motivation to do so, clarity that may be obscured by the vices of 
pride.  
 
Another approach to virtue clusters 
We have identified clusters of virtues based on conceptual arguments about 
resemblances among virtues within a cluster, differences from virtues of other clusters, and 
distinct functions. An alternative approach to clustering is offered by the VIA Inventory of 
Strengths (VIA-IS), formerly the "Values in Action Inventory” (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). 
This measure, consisting of 240 Likert scale items was designed to identify an individual’s 
profile of character strengths based on Peterson and Seligman’s classification. They proposed 
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a taxonomy consisting of six overarching, culturally ubiquitous “virtues” (wisdom and 
knowledge, courage, humanity, justice, temperance and transcendence), exemplified in 
twenty-four character strengths. Peterson and Seligman (2004) put forward the view that 
strengths and virtues are hierarchically related domains, with character strengths representing 
more specific instantiations of the general principles of virtue. For instance, within the 
higher-order “virtue” category of courage, Peterson and Seligman (2004) locate four 
character strengths of bravery, perseverance, honesty and “zest”. On our schema, bravery 
and perseverance belong together as virtues of willpower, but honesty is a kind of truthfulness 
with links to justice, and therefore a virtue of intelligent caring.  
They also proposed a temperance cluster, which encompasses forgiveness and mercy, 
humility and modesty, prudence, and self-control. Again, the cluster seems malformed by 
conceptual standards: following millennia of tradition we make prudence practical wisdom 
(the intelligence in intelligent caring), which we think of as distributed throughout the virtues 
of intelligent caring: it is the concerned understanding of justice, truthfulness, and other moral 
matters. Disputes and discussions about virtue categories are not new, but what is relatively 
novel is the validation of such classifications by factor analysis of the VIA (Peterson & 
Seligman, 2004). 
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Space will not permit a full review of extant factor analyses of the VIA. However, it 
is noteworthy that none of the studies conducted to date have corroborated a six factor 
solution that would support the original categorisation of the VIA taxonomy. Solutions across 
different samples have been mutually inconsistent. Macdonald, Bore and Munro (2008) 
report that the 24 character strengths of the VIA were well represented in both a four-factor 
and even a one-factor solution that speaks to Aristotle’s “logical entailment” position. 
Shryack, Steger, Krueger and Kallie (2010), suggest that either a three-factor or four-factor 
solution best fits the data in an adult sample, while McGrath, Greenberg and Hall-Simmonds 
(in press) identify the same three factors across a dozen adult samples, which they label 
“caring,” “inquisitiveness,” and “self-control,” echoing the earlier findings of McGrath 
(2015). McGrath and Walker (2016) report a four-factor solution in youths aged 10–17, 
consisting of intellectual strengths, strengths of self-control, and two interpersonal factors 
reflecting general engagement and “other-directedness.” 
Thus the conceptual differentiation between virtues of willpower and the allocentric, 
or perhaps more broadly, the virtues of intelligent caring, finds some synergy here. McGrath 
et al. (in press) and McGrath and Walker (2016) found a factor they labelled “self-control” 
in adult and youth samples respectively, while McGrath et al.’s (in press) “caring” and 
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McGrath and Walker’s (2016) “other-directedness” factors seem to describe similar qualities 
in adults and youth. 
We bring factor analysis into consideration, not to provide support for our allocentric 
quintet (though the existing factor analyses do consistently show character strengths of the 
VIA loading onto separate self-control and “other-focused” factors that echo our distinction), 
but to illustrate that “virtue clustering” can be conceived and examined in diverse ways. 
Clusters may be based on theorized relations of family resemblance, interdependence, and 
exclusion (as we propose here). These can be compared with empirically-derived clusters 
based on mathematical relationships among questionnaire items (as with factor analysis and 
principal components analysis). Depending on how adequately one believes questionnaire 
items tap the constructs being measured, factor analyses could challenge existing 
theoretically derived categorisations of virtues–for instance, the six overarching virtues of 
the VIA that have singularly failed to emerge in any factor analysis. 
Current accounts of empirically-derived “virtue clustering,“ achieved post hoc by 
means of factor analysis of VIA items, are germane to the current paper, for they shed light 
on other (viz., mathematical) means of grouping virtues. However, the method is limited by 
the adequacy of questionnaire items designed to tap the virtue constructs, which in turn 
depends on the conceptual sophistication of those who formulate the items. Furthermore, the 
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form (rather than the content) of those items can affect the correlations. For example, 
negatively worded items across a whole range of questionnaire items frequently load 
together. Thus, while factor analyses may complement conceptual theorising–offering a 
means of checking initial intuitions–they do not replace a more conceptual a priori approach, 
because they are blind to the underlying reasons for such clustering. 
We also need an understanding of conceptual relationships that goes deeper than 
purely mathematical relationships among questionnaire items–the “correlation matrix” of 
factor analysis. We need an understanding of relationships of similarity, difference, 
causation, support, and exclusion among traits. The starting point of this endeavor is a careful 
analysis of conceptual relationships, but we think such analysis might then be augmented by 
experimental studies that attempt to demonstrate causal and correlational relations among 
traits. For example, an experimental intervention might show that promoting compassion also 
fosters gratitude.  
 Such studies are neither necessary nor sufficient to establish these relationships, and 
we highlight limitations in the methods of such studies (see below). But this kind of approach 
affords a different and more robust corroboration of the putative relationships than mere 
factor analyses of questionnaires. We do not believe conceptual analysis should be 
subordinated to this method–that it stands or falls with the approach–but rather, that it offers 
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a way of linking conceptual analysis of the relationships among virtues to empirical research 
that speaks to the relationships. 
We are not aware of research linking conceptual theorising with experimental studies 
of one virtue reinforcing another. However, we submit that it would be an interesting angle 
for future research, especially since factor analyses of the VIA have tended to identify an 
“intellectual/inquisitiveness” cluster and a “self-control” cluster, alongside a virtue 
constellation representing “caring” or “other-directedness” (McGrath et al., in press; 
McGrath and Walker, 2016). We turn now to a somewhat more fine-grained discussion of 
the interrelations among virtues belonging to a sub-type of the virtues of intelligent caring. 
These virtues might also be called virtues of benevolence.  
 
An allocentric quintet 
The members of the allocentric quintet are compassion, generosity, gratitude, 
forgivingness, and a guest member, humility. The first four are dispositions to care about 
other people for their sake: to care about their health, happiness, safety, pleasure, comfort, or 
prospects–their wellbeing very broadly conceived. They form a sub-group within the larger 
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class of virtues of intelligent caring. They are “unified,” to this extent, by the commonality 
of their orientation to their objects: They are all kinds of benevolence. 
Their orientation for the sake of the other is not meant to exclude reference to the self 
of the agent who possesses them; rather, the virtues we have in mind are also self-referential 
and radically egalitarian: it is I am for you as you were / are / would be / for me. In other 
words, benevolence rules out depreciation of the other vis-à-vis self. The self-reference is 
clearest in the cases of gratitude and forgivingness, which are often (though not always) 
instantiated as gratitude for a benefit received by the subject himself, and forgiveness of an 
offense against the subject himself (Roberts, 2015, pp. 890–91; Pettigrove, 2012). But it is 
also elemental to the generosity and full respectfulness of these virtues that the other is 
generously seen in his or her full agency, and not, in truncation, as a “patient” to / on whom 
I act as the only full “agent” in the dyad (see Vanier, 1997, pp. 77, 109, 112). The rich 
philanthropist for whom the import of his liberality is that he overflows to these inferior, 
needy ones is not authentically generous toward those to whom he gives, because he is subtly 
using them for his self-aggrandizement.  To highlight a second point to distinguish our 
concept of allocentricity, we note that Triandis, Leung, Villareal and Clack (1985) use 
“allocentric” to refer to individuals who manifest, at the level of personality, tendencies 
associated with the collectivist pole of individualist-collectivist societies–that is to say, 
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giving priority to in-group goals (family, tribe or nation) and following group norms. Clearly, 
we are not using the term this way. 
Humility is not itself allocentric, but because the “other”-orientation of the properly 
allocentric virtues requires some degree of humility, and because they tend to promote it. 
The vices of pride are all forms of self-centeredness that block or disturb the connection to 
others that characterize the allocentric virtues. Humility, as the absence of these vices, aids 
allocentricity by being an unblockage of that connection.  
The allocentric virtues are connected to the virtues of willpower by a kind of 
situational dependency. Benevolence felt and practiced under conditions of threat may 
require courage. Sustaining a forgiving attitude may require perseverance if the offender 
persists in offending or is lukewarm in repentance.  
The virtues within any of the three kinds that we have surveyed are connected to 
others within the same kind by commonalities, and with virtues of other kinds by connections 
of dependence and enhancement. The four properly allocentric virtues, for example, are all 
forms of benevolence, and differentiated by the way the benevolence is expressed and 
directed: generosity is benevolence expressed in giving (goods, time, the benefit of a doubt), 
compassion is benevolence toward sufferers, gratitude is benevolence toward benefactors, 
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forgiveness is benevolence toward offenders. These various forms of benevolence face 
somewhat different difficulties and involve different construals of the one toward whom 
benevolence is felt and practiced, but they are connected to each other by a common person-
oriented well-wishing and well-doing. Compassion may precipitate (or “cause”) forgiveness 
and forgiveness compassion. Generosity may take the form of compassionate action. These 
connections are due to the two virtues’ both being kinds of benevolence. We could consider 
each member of the quintet in relation to each other member, but for lack of pages and fear 
that such cranking analysis would be tedious, we will just consider generosity in its 
connections to each of the other virtues. For each pair we will follow a bit of conceptual 
analysis with a critical review of the relevant empirical literature.  
 
Generosity and Gratitude 
Gratitude and generosity are conceptually reciprocal in the sense that gratitude is a 
virtuous response to perceived generosity, and the ideally generous giver is gratified by the 
grateful response. The recipient sees the gift as expressing the giver’s well-wishing, and the 
giver sees the recipient as acknowledging the goodness of the gift and of the giver’s good 
will. Furthermore, the grateful person is generous in feeling grateful and in giving tokens of 
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gratitude. The generosity of gratitude is evidenced in the free, frank, and happy “return” of a 
token for the benefactor’s benevolence and gift. In betokening the grateful good will of the 
beneficiary, the token is a “gift” to the benefactor. These logical reciprocities suggest that 
people with the virtues of gratitude and generosity will feel a happy bond with one another, 
a bond that is disrupted or diminished by evidences of stinginess and ingratitude.  
We are not denying that people sometimes feel gratitude in situations that lack a 
generous benefactor, or that people can behave “generously” without being gratified by 
expressions of gratitude. People can be mistaken in their gratitude, and so-called generous 
behavior can be motivated in many ways that don’t conform to the virtue of generosity. Our 
remarks are about the virtues of gratitude and generosity. 
Our remarks also suggest the empirical hypothesis that these virtues will reinforce one 
another: the generous person will respond to the beneficiary’s gratitude with deepened 
generosity, and the grateful person will feel the more grateful for the generous person’s joy 
in the grateful person’s return of thanks. Since these dispositions are virtues, not just 
relationships between particular persons (in, say, the manner of friendship), we can expect 
this pattern of reinforcement to bear fruit beyond the particular relationship. Grateful and 
generous persons will become more generous and grateful in other relationships.  
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Consistently with these conceptual remarks, Bartlett and DeSteno (2006) showed that a 
laboratory-induced state of gratitude led participants to help a person who had previously 
helped them, even when so doing carried a cost. Gratitude seems to have encouraged 
generous behavior. In a second study, they found that the effect of induced gratitude extended 
to behaving generously towards strangers who had not previously helped participants, in 
“upstream reciprocity.” This finding supports the thesis that grateful persons become more 
generous and grateful in relationships beyond the dyad of original benefactor and beneficiary.  
However, this kind of “supporting evidence” for our analysis is subject to the familiar 
criticism that laboratory-induced states may poorly imitate real life. Bartlett and DeSteno 
(2006) brought about state gratitude as part of an elaborate manipulation that involved 
orchestrating three induced states (gratitude, amusement, and “neutral”). With the help of an 
experimental confederate, three scenarios were stage-managed after what participants 
believed was an experimental trial. In the gratitude condition, participants were led to believe 
that data from their computer-based trial had been lost. This was achieved by having the 
screen go blank–a result of the confederate secretly pulling the plug. When the confederate 
“recovered” the participant’s data, the subject was supposed (by the experimenter) to feel 
grateful.  
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This experiment raises questions. How do we know the subjects were grateful, rather 
than just relieved? How do we know they cared enough about the data to be distressed? How 
do we know they saw the confederate as benevolent toward them? How do we know that the 
experimental setting didn’t induce a whole set of background assumptions in the minds of 
the subjects such that they depersonalized the situation and the confederate?  
Empirical evidence for a “feedback loop” between gratitude and generosity witnessed in 
acts of purely reciprocal kindness is not surprising, though Exline, Lisan and Lisan (2012) 
found this was qualified by whether a kindness recalled in an experimental setting was 
“normative” (socially expected) or “non-normative.” Examples of non-normative kindness 
would be ones performed by a stranger or rival or supererogatorily, rather than by a loved 
one or as a fulfilment of duty. Exline et al. (2012) report that normative kindnesses yielded 
more positive emotion (such as gratitude and love) and less negative emotion (e.g. mistrust) 
than non-normative kindnesses, and led to participants’ being more generous in giving money 
to charity.  
It is unsurprising that non-trivial kindnesses of strangers may arouse suspicion, not 
gratitude (perhaps they are not seen as generous, but as ulteriorly motivated); this is 
consistent with our thesis of conceptual reciprocity. We more confidently impute motives to 
 28 
loved ones than to strangers or rivals, and we expect loved ones to be benevolent. 
Furthermore, we are better prepared to feel bonded with those close to us.  
Gulliford and Morgan (in press) report that participants in one empirical study described 
negative responses to a benefactor’s generosity, such as a sense of indebtedness, guilt, 
awkwardness and embarrassment, which in some cases “soured” the experience of gratitude 
they reported. These findings echo features of gratitude that laypeople identified and rated as 
negative in an earlier prototype analysis of gratitude (Morgan, Gulliford, & Kristjánsson, 
2014); but this finding too would be consistent with the reciprocity thesis, if we suppose that 
the “negative” feeling of indebtedness, etc. is not, after all, a kind of gratitude, and that the 
person who feels it doesn’t see the “benefactor” as generous, but as burdensome.  
Bear in mind, as well, that Exline et al. (2012), like Bartlett and deSteno (2006), relied 
on an induction method. They called on participants to recall a kindness conferred on them 
in the past to see whether this led to warmer affective reactions and to giving greater amounts 
of money to charity. A problem with induction studies of this sort is the presupposition that 
they accurately conjure the desired emotional or other state by recalling past experiences, 
imagining future experiences, or asking participants to engage in mood-congruent behaviors 
such as writing a gratitude letter (see Kruse, Chancellor, Ruberton, & Lyubomirsky, 2014 
below). While manipulation checks can assess whether a given method has induced a state, 
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these states are temporary and may tell us little about a participant’s enduring qualities. It 
would be a mistake to draw conclusions about long-standing character traits purely on the 
basis of an induced state. Some people may be more susceptible to such inductions than 
others, without this having any bearing on whether they have a corresponding deeper 
disposition. Stanislavskian actors get very good at self-inducing states characteristic of 
whatever character they happen to be playing (Stanislavski, 1936, 1989). Such states are thus 
relatively independent of the character of the individual actor. It also seems likely that people 
naturally vary in talent for self-inducing a variety of states.  
While empirical research seems to support our analysis of reciprocity between the virtues 
of generosity and gratitude, inherent limitations in available methods raise doubts how much 
empirical studies ultimately buttress or corroborate conceptual analyses, particularly if 
inferences about virtues are drawn on the basis of temporarily induced states.  
 
Generosity and Compassion 
Unlike generosity, compassion (Nussbaum, 2001) requires a perception of defect or 
suffering in the other: but many compassionate actions can count as generous as well. Both 
virtues dispose us to wishes that another person be advantaged or helped. The generous give 
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of their resources (time, treasure, attention) and the compassionate give aid to relieve 
suffering or defect that may require the same gifts. Where we would be unlikely to attribute 
compassion because the distress of the other is mild–the wine has run out, the host distressed, 
and I offer to run home and get some–we may attribute generosity. Compassion qualifies as 
generous when it is “costly” to the helper. Thus we have reason to expect an intervention that 
succeeds in making a person either more generous or more compassionate to tend also to 
make her more compassionate or generous. But because of compassion’s relation to 
suffering, a person with low tolerance for others’ distress may be generous without being 
very compassionate; so the causal influence should be stronger one way than the other.  
That compassion and generosity are linked is at the heart of the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis (Batson & Leonard, 1987). We can assume that some degree of compassion gave 
rise to generosity in those studies where participants were given the opportunity to give 
money or time to a charitable cause (Karremans, Van Lange, & Holland, 2005; LaBouff, 
Rowatt, Johnson, Tsang, & Willerton, 2012). Karremans et al (2005) focused specifically on 
the link between forgiveness and generosity (though forgiveness is itself a kind of 
generosity). Karremans, et al. (2005) found that asking participants to reflect on past actions 
of forgiving others (vs. past “unforgiveness”) increased the probability of donating money to 
and volunteering for charity; in other words, that causing a state of  forgiveness gave rise to 
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a state of generosity. However, in addition to the problems regarding induction studies 
previously mentioned, using money as a dependent variable is also problematic. It will not 
have a consistent subjective value to all experimental participants. Moreover, it seems risky 
to assume that donors have been moved by compassion or forgiveness to act generously when 
they might have donated the money for some other reason. And using volunteering as a 
dependent measure is not without problems since, within the experimental context, the 
decision to volunteer could be strongly influenced by social desirability biases.  
These studies offer some support for the mutual relationship between generosity and 
compassion, though we must acknowledge again that the kind of verification such empirical 
studies yield is subject to methodological limitations. While such studies seem to corroborate 
that the virtues of the quintet are interrelated and hence mutually reinforcing, the kind of 
support they offer is perhaps relatively weak given the inadequacies of the methods. By 
comparison, conceptual analysis offers a more detailed and conceptually diversified 
understanding. Nonetheless, the method at least attempts to marry conceptual concerns with 
empirical interests, and tries to offer some empirical substantiation of the theoretical 
connections among traits. 
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Generosity and Forgivingness 
In forgiveness, a person gives an offender a “gift”–something good that the offender 
does not deserve by the canons of strict justice. That good is above all good will, well 
wishing, and the cessation of hostility (Murphy & Hampton, 1988; Roberts, 1995; Pettigrove, 
2012). We may think, therefore, that a person who is generally generous, wishing and 
working and “paying” (in money, time, or attention) for the wellbeing of others, will tend to 
be more forgiving than a stingy one or a person who always thinks in terms of and insists on 
strict justice. But note that the generosity must be genuinely allocentric; if it consists in “gift”-
giving with an eye to reciprocity or exercising power over others, or getting credit for one’s 
well-doing, we have no reason to think that such an agent will also be a noteworthy forgiver.  
The anger or resentment that marks situations calling for forgiveness adds a peculiar 
element. It seems likely that a person whose social thinking tends away from strict tit-for-tat 
justice and toward gracious giving will also think in such terms where offenses against 
himself or those he cares about are at issue. If forgiveness is a kind of generosity, it is a 
special kind, in which the potential selfish motive is not possessiveness (of goods or time, 
say), but retention of anger or resentment.  
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Studies show that forgiveness increases benevolence towards an offender but, as was the 
case with Bartlett and DeSteno’s (2006) findings concerning gratitude, it also increases 
generosity towards other people. Karremans et al. (2005) demonstrated that the effects of 
forgiveness “spill over” beyond the relationship with the forgiven offender. As we saw in the 
previous section, Karremans et al. (2005) found that asking participants to reflect on past 
forgiveness (vs. past “unforgiveness”) increased their probability of donating money to and 
volunteering for the charity, Humanitas. In much the same way as an induced state of 
gratitude promoted generosity (Bartlett & DeSteno, 2006), an induced state of forgiveness 
apparently fostered two kinds of benevolence in giving (Karremans et al., 2005). Thus the 
empirical claim is that a state of forgiveness restores a “generalized pro-social orientation.” 
The studies by Karremans et al. (2005) therefore empirically reinforce the case for the 
interrelations among the virtues of generosity and forgiveness. However, as we noted, the 
temporary state of forgiveness brought about in the study is a far cry from the trait of 
forgivingness –the enduring disposition to forgive other people over time. So the kind of 
support such a study affords for the analysis of the relations between the virtues of the 
allocentric quartet is perhaps best characterized as instructive and relevant, but imperfect. 
 
Generosity and Humility 
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As earlier noted, on our conception, humility is the absence of such vices as vanity, 
arrogance, and the other vices of pride (Roberts & Wood, 2007; Roberts, 2016). These vices 
are all ways of being concerned for (desiring or cherishing) a misconceived kind of personal 
“importance,” differing from one another in nuances of the misconception. Vain persons seek 
personal importance through self-display and conceive that importance as coming from 
people’s admiration, envy, awe, or fear of them; the arrogant find or seek their importance in 
entitlements and privileges, even abstracted from their rationales; the domineering get their 
supposed importance by throwing their weight around; and so forth. The concern for this 
pseudo-importance stands in stark contrast with wanting to be loved and having a secure and 
confident sense of oneself and one’s agency. For alternative conceptions of humility, see 
Flanagan (1990), Driver (2001), and Whitcomb, Battaly, Baehr & Howard-Snyder (2015). 
If we conceive generosity as fully allocentric, not just as a rational disposition to give 
goods away, it is easy to see generosity’s tension with the vices of pride. To the extent that a 
big donor donates for self-inflating reasons–to be adulated, to have a building named after 
her, to secure privileges–she is not generous. All the vices of self-importance place the self 
at center stage. Some of them are strongly social (anti-social). Consider vanity’s concern with 
others’ emotions, or self-righteousness’s insistence on comparisons. But they are socially 
antithetical to generosity. So these concerns need to be overturned if generosity is to flourish.  
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Humility is a kind of purity, a freedom from contamination by the vices of pride. No one 
is perfectly pure in this regard. If we made perfect humility the standard, none of us would 
be generous or humble. But generosity cannot prevail without some degree of humility’s 
purity. If generosity requires some humility, then interventions that make someone more 
generous should also make her more humble. If someone can be brought to care genuinely 
about another’s wellbeing, then to that extent, she will be unconcerned with her own pseudo-
importance. Also, any intervention that increases someone’s humility will open space in her 
outlook for generosity. 
Exline and Hill (2012) found humility to be a consistent and robust predictor of generous 
behavior, while ruling out personality factors as mediators of the link (Big Five, self-esteem, 
entitlement, religiosity and social desirability). They also included a measure of gratitude in 
one study which, along with the personality measures, could not predict generosity better 
than humility. A possible explanation is that humility opens up allocentricity generally, 
whereas gratitude’s effect is weaker because its target of generosity remains mainly the 
benefactor. 
Like a number of studies referenced here, Exline and Hill (2012) used behavioural 
measures of generosity, which included the giving of charitable donations (see also 
Karremans et al., 2005). A problem with this metric is that it offers an assessment of only 
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one kind of generosity (monetary). In addition to giving participants a $15 shopping voucher 
for completing the personality measures, Exline and Hill (2012) gave participants $5 in $1 
bills expressly to give away, and while participants were free to decide how much they gave 
to charity, this expedient seems to stumble on the varying meaning of money to people, as 
previously noted. To tap another kind of generosity, Exline and Hill (2012) offered the same 
participants the opportunity to give additional time to the research by completing and mailing 
back post-study surveys. Humility scores predicted generous behaviour with both time and 
money. In a second study humility scores predicted the amount of money participants were 
willing to give to an anonymous future study participant, while a third demonstrated that 
humility correlated with participants’ self-reported motives to be kind to others.  
This trio of studies supports the hypothesis that generosity and humility are mutually 
reinforcing. However, they raise further thorny problems. First, how accurately do people 
self-report their motives to be kind? Second, how reliably and accurately do questionnaires 
created to tap humility achieve this end? The latter point applies equally to all psychometric 
assessments, but in Exline and Hill’s (2012) study it is particularly pertinent since longer and 
shorter versions of humility scales were used across the three studies, causing a lack of 
consistency in operationalizing humility. Study 1 used a 21 item self-report measure, which 
was also used in Study 2. Study 3 made use of an expanded 36 item inventory. 
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The problem of self-report measures is a recurrent, familiar and serious limitation for 
empirical research. The first and most important question is whether such measures validly 
and reliably capture what they hope to measure (see Gulliford, Morgan & Kristjánsson, 
2013). Many measures can be criticized for operationalizing concepts simplistically, 
reductively or inaccurately.  The problem of conceptual sharpness affects reporter reliability. 
Self-deception, social-desirability biases and demand characteristics all affect the reliability 
of participant responses.  
A number of attempts have been made to circumvent problems of self-report. For 
instance, LaBouff et al. (2012) buttressed explicit measures of humility with an attempt to 
measure humility implicitly, while Kruse et al.  (2014) offered an assessment of state humility 
based on judges’ coding of thank you letters written to induce gratitude in the study.  
While such an approach may get around the problem of participants’ self-bias, it cannot 
eliminate the problem of partiality altogether, since judges’ coding may be biased towards 
what the experimenters hope to find. Inter-rater reliability coefficients from two judges 
address this problem to some degree, but unless the coders are blind to the purposes of the 
study, there is nonetheless a risk that the attempt to be objective will be compromised by 
knowing the study’s aims. 
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Taken together, our review of the empirical literature pertaining to how generosity 
relates to the virtues of gratitude, compassion, forgiveness and humility offers a degree of 
support for our conceptual theorising that these five virtues are mutually reinforcing and form 
a virtue cluster that we have designated the “allocentric quintet.” As far as we know, our 
attempt to link conceptual analysis of the hypothesized links between the virtues in a 
hypothesized cluster across a range of relevant empirical studies is novel.  
As we earlier noted, factor analyses of the VIA classification (McGrath, 2015; 
Macdonald et al., 2008; Shryack et al., 2010; McGrath & Walker, 2015; McGrath et al., in 
press) have revealed clusters of character strengths. Though factor analysis identifies the 
clusters on the basis of mathematical relations rather than conceptual analysis, such research 
is relevant to the current project. It shows that virtues form clusters, which often, though not 
always, map onto those brought to light by conceptual analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
This paper has had two main interrelated aims. The first is to propose a novel conceptual 
analysis of the “unity” of the virtues in the character of a person. We have defended the thesis 
that virtues come in clusters or systems that are differentiated from one another by their broad 
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functions within the person’s overall character. That is, like the discrete but interdependent 
systems that go to make up a healthy functioning body, the systems of virtues sustain and 
exploit one another in a healthy functioning character. We have identified three such systems 
or clusters of virtues — the virtues of intelligent caring, the virtues of willpower, and the 
virtues of humility. The virtues within a cluster are “unified” by some commonality. For 
example, the virtues of justice, compassion, sense of duty, truthfulness, and generosity, 
among others, constitute a cluster because they all are kinds of intelligent caring. The 
allocentric virtues, a sub-class of the virtues of intelligent caring, are all forms of intelligent 
caring about people (and perhaps other sentient creatures). The virtues of willpower are all 
capacities or abilities to manage impulses in the form of desires, emotions, and habits. The 
virtues of humility are all absences of the various vices of pride. These kinds or systems of 
virtues support and exploit one another in a healthy character.  
The second main aim of this paper has been to explore whether, and if so how, empirical 
psychology can function as support for conceptual analysis of the kind that we are proposing. 
Our discussion of the conceptual analysis and empirical studies of the relations between pairs 
of virtues in the allocentric quintet has served to illustrate this exploration. 
In bringing conceptual analysis of the relations among five virtues alongside empirical 
research on their relations to one another, we have found a degree of empirical support for 
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our claims about how these qualities are intimately related to one another and mutually 
reinforcing. However, we have recognized that such studies face methodological limitations. 
One major problem is that conclusions about relationships between enduring dispositions, 
such as the virtues of forgivingness and generosity, are based on temporarily induced states. 
A second and no less important issue concerns how well even those temporarily induced 
states correspond to states of virtues that appear in moral agents in the course of their lives. 
A third problem is that our conceptual analysis of the “unity” of virtues suggests that virtues 
intertwine in ways that may preclude, in practice, isolating them from one another in the way 
that existing studies sometimes attempt to do. And finally, our analysis of the virtue of 
humility suggests the importance of keeping an eye on related vices.  
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